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L1 ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER AT THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF CALIFORNIA

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L2 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

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MODERATOR: Welcome. Welcome to the regular Friday luncheon of the Commonwealth Club of California. And we are especially happy to see our new members seated across the room from me, and request the new members to stand so that we can greet them.

[Applause]

MODERATOR: We are so happy to have you with us and hope you'll continue to attend these meetings and meet some of the wonderful members of this organization.

Next Friday, Paul Erdman, international banker and author, will speak, and the subject of his talk will be "The Crash of '79: Fact or Fiction?" It's a special ticket luncheon. You must buy your tickets prior to the meeting because you cannot be assured of seating if you try to buy them the day of the meeting. We apologize in advance if you cannot be seated that day. The same applies to the meeting the next week, which will be Dr. Richard F. Starr speaking on the subject, "The Soviet Union's Colonial Empire," which I think will be somewhat of a sequel to Paul Erdman's talk.

Today's speaker, as you are aware if you've been reading the news, just has stepped into somewhat greater responsibilities than those designated in the announcement for the meeting. I won't outline those to you. I think you're all aware of them.

Admiral Stansfield Turner of the United States Navy was sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence on March 9th, 1977. He heads the intelligence community, the foreign intelligence agencies of the United States, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency.

He's a native of Highland Park, Illinois and he entered Amherst College in '41, and two years later was appointed to the Naval Academy at Annapolis. And after graduation in '46, he served a year at sea before entering Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar for work on a masters degree in philosophy, politics, and economics.

After Oxford, he held a variety of sea assignments, including command of a mine sweeper, a destroyer, and a guided-missile frigate, which he placed in commission. His shore assignments included the Political and Military Policy Division in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, the Advanced Management Program at Harvard Business School, and Executive Assistant and Naval Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.

He was promoted to rear admiral in May '70, and shortly thereafter assumed command of a carrier task group of the Sixth Fleet while serving aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Independence.

After that, he directed the Systems Analysis Division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

On June 30th, '72, he became the 36th President of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, with the rank of vice admiral. During his two-year tenure there he instituted major revisions in the curriculum to strengthen its academic content.

In August '74 he became Commander of the United States Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet, Atlantic. He served there until August '75, when he was named to become Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, headquartered in Naples. Upon assuming that position on September 1st, '75, he was promoted to the rank of full admiral. He held this command until his departure in March '77 to assume his present duties.

Admiral Stansfield, we are honored -- pardon me. Admiral Turner, we are honored [laughter] -- we are honored to have you with us.

[Applause]

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Thank you, Ken. A true spy never goes by his true name, anyway.

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yesterday President Carter announced a major reorganization of the intelligence apparatus of our country. This was the culmination of six months of intensive study. This, and a number of other recent actions the President has taken with respect to intelligence, have done much to strengthen our intelligence community.

First, they have improved the effectiveness of intelligence by insuring strong control over it.

And secondly, they have insured stringent oversight of all of our intelligence activities and operations.

The strengthening of control has come about by giving to my office -- that is, the Director of Central Intelligence -- full responsibility for the budgets of all the various intelligence agencies of our government and full responsibility for setting the tasks which those agencies are to go about in attempting to collect intelligence data.

Intelligence, you see, in our government is dispersed over a number of agencies and departments, not just in the CIA. There is intelligence in the State Department, in the Defense Department, in the Treasury, in the FBI, and even in the new Energy Department. I happen to be director of one of those intelligence entities, the CIA. But I have another job, the Director of Central Intelligence. And the position there, the function there is to bring together in a cooperative manner all of these intelligence agencies and activities.

The new organizational arrangements which the President has set forth emphasize the importance of this second assignment which I have, the pulling together of all of these activities, especially when collecting intelligence.

Now, the process of collecting -- and that's really a euphemism for spying -- is one where we want to be particularly efficient and particularly to have full control, because collecting intelligence is the most expensive part of the business and it also is the part of the business where there is the greatest legal and ethical risk.

But collecting is only one half of the business. The other half is interpreting the data that you have gathered. This is really research or analysis, just the same as is done in most of our major corporations and on all of our academic campuses.

And let me make it clear that the President, in his new plan for the intelligence world of the United States, has by no means established a czar over intelligence interpretation, as some of the media have misinterpreted. In point of fact, the new plan specifically provides for the continued independence of interpretive or analytic agencies within the Department of Defense and the Department of State, and we seek and we welcome this competitive analysis with that of the Central Intelligence Agency. We want to have divergent and different views brought forward. We recognize very clearly that intelligence does not come by revelation; it always is enshrouded in some uncertainty, and there are always alternative interpretations. In fact, I get very suspicious when any intelligence analyst comes to me with a very precise answer to a particular problem.

In fact, I had just the other day an interesting experience in that regard. I was wandering around the halls of the CIA, poking my head into offices to see what was going on. And I walked into one, and here were six analysts sitting around a computer terminal. And I looked as they pressed the buttons and data came out, and I said, "What are you working on?"

And they looked a little chagrined as they turned to me and said, "Well, we have a very difficult problem. We've been tasked to find out whether there are good golf courses in heaven."

Well, I breathed a little and I said, "Now, how do you go about a difficult assignment like that?"

And they said, "Well, we first turned to the satellite people and we asked if they could see anything. And then we turned to the spying people and we said, 'Can you make contact with anybody in authority?' And then we turned to the signals people and we said, 'Can you intercept any communications between earth and the golf facilities?'"

And I said, "Where did you come out?"

And they said, "Well, like good analysts, we tried to be objective, so we appointed an A team and a B team." And they said, "The A team comes up with the answer that there's a 73% probability that there are at least three good golf courses in heaven."

And I said, "That's fine, and I'm very encouraged by that. But now tell me about Team B."

Well, they hesitated a little bit and they finally said, "Mr. Director, we have to tell you that Team B finds that next Tuesday at 10 o'clock is your first tee-off time."

[laughter]

Well, if I'm still here next Tuesday, I believe that the new organizational arrangement that the President has set forth will in fact insure better performance in both collecting and interpreting our intelligence data. I am confident, also, that the President and many other of our top executives spent the great amount of time that they did in developing this new plan because they recognize the need for good intelligence today, and, in fact, recognize that it is probably more important to have good intelligence today than 30 years ago, when we first organized a central intelligence arrangement in our country.

Let's look back 30 years. We were at that time the dominant military power in the world. We had strategic superiority in every sense. Since then, the Soviet Union found that they simply cannot use their system to grow and compete with us in any other area than

the military, and they have become a world power based on their military might.

Today, large portions of that military strength is deployed against the NATO frontiers and ranges across the oceans of the world. In this condition of rough military parity, it is more essential than ever that we have good intelligence, because you can obtain real advantages from being able to understand and estimate a potential adversaries strength and intentions.

Now, he seldom tells you about this, but he does give away important clues from time to time. And if you watch these over a long period and piece them all together, you can gain read advantages, you can gain what can be the difference between victory and defeat on the battlefield.

But if we look past the military, we also find that there are great changes in our economic position in these past 30 years. Thirty years ago we were totally independent economically, and it's almost too obvious to point to the necessity for importing oil today to remind ourselves how interdependent our economic status is in this age. And if we, as a country, do not have good intelligence data on the economic potential, capabilities and intentions of many countries around the world, we're simply going to lose out in the marketplace.

And look, also, at the difference politically in these past 30 years. Thirty years ago we could almost tell anybody around the world what we wanted them to do. Today, even some of the smallest evolving nations are determined to go their own way, to do their own thing, and not to be dictated to by either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Here again, if we are going to play the role of leadership in the world that is cast upon us today, we must, through good intelligence, be able to understand the cultures, the politics, the personalities, and the economics of many of these countries. If we don't, we may well be outmaneuvered.

Now, at the same time that we need good intelligence, perhaps more today than in the past, we are also understandably and justifiably concerned that intelligence be collected, analyzed, and employed in ways that are in consonance with our concepts of society. We simply cannot afford to utilize methods of collecting secret intelligence data that our society feels would jeopardize the very values that we are determined to defend.

Here, then, is where the other half of the President's new program comes into play: stringent oversight. We have taken a number of approaches to this.

First, we have reemphasized the importance of the Presi-

dent's Intelligence Oversight Board. This board, which is constituted of three very distinguished citizens, is available to you, to any of my employees, to anyone who wants to write a letter, to make an appeal and say, "That fellow Turner's doing some dastardly things." And those appeals, those suggestions go to that board directly without going through any chain of command, and it then investigates them and reports only to the President of the United States.

Beyond this, we have supported legislation, which is now before the Congress, to insure that any wiretapping done in the United States in the name of foreign intelligence does not violate the rights of our citizens.

Next, we have been looking to the past and trying to insure the public that any abuses that did exist are truly behind us. For instance, I am pleased to announce to you today, for the first time, that the recommendations of the recent Rockefeller Commission on Intelligence, insofar as they were directed at the CIA, have all been implemented, have all been completed. We took that report very seriously.

We are also looking the past squarely in the eye, even when it is unpleasant to do so. On Wednesday of this week I presented to the Congress every detail of information which is available to me on the drug-related activities of the CIA from 1953 to 1965. Now, that was 12 to 24 years ago, and we all hate to have to dig up the past and rehash it when it's unpleasant as this is, especially when we must recognize that national attitudes and mores change. Often what was condoned yesterday will be condemned today.

But what happened in this case is that documentation was found in our retired records archives which had not been found when there was congressional investigation on this subject about two years ago. Immediately upon being informed of this find, I felt obliged to notify the President and the Congress.

Now, some of these revelations concern activities here in your wonderful city. I'm apologetic for that and regret it. But I can also assure you that nothing of that sort is or will be tolerated in the CIA today.

The most inexplicable part of these activities in San Francisco, and elsewhere in this country, was the testing of drugs on various individuals without their knowledge or consent. We do not have the names of the individuals tested, but now that we do have this additional information, we are making every effort we can to use the clues that this incomplete information gives us to identify and locate these people, and notify them.

Now, again I would urge that we recognize that this is past history, two decades ago. The CIA's frank and open handling

of this disclosure is part of an effort to open the American intelligence activity to greater public scrutiny than ever in the past. This is part of a voluntary effort to level with and inform the American people without damaging that ongoing intelligence activity which must be kept secret.

For instance, we have tried to become more accessible to the media than ever before. We invited the cameras of Time magazine and of the 60 Minutes program into the CIA building for the first time. I'm not sure that was really a good idea, because we've lost a lot of that mystique when the public has found that the James Bonds of our country go to work in a very ordinary-looking office building and with very ordinary-looking fellow workers. I just couldn't get Dan Rather, in any way, to film any of us with a cloak and dagger.

We are also attempting to make more of our product available to you, the public. The publication of unclassified intelligence studies is one of the most important substantive initiatives that we have taken. It stems from a conviction that the intelligence community works for the American public, and the public is therefore entitled to benefit by its product to the extent feasible. We intend to publish in unclassified form the maximum amount of intelligence analysis that we possibly can.

To date, we've published several major studies which I believe are making an important contribution to the public debate in this country.

In March, we published a report on the world energy situation, and shortly thereafter, two subsidiary studies on the Chinese and Soviet energy situations. These studies, together, said that world energy production capability will not meet world demand for energy sometime in the early to mid-1980s. As a result, there will be pressure on prices.

Why won't the capability for production meet demand? Well, one reason is that we estimate that Soviet production of oil is going to drop off markedly in about 1980.

Now, the Soviets haven't told us this. They haven't told anyone, even though this will have a major impact on the entire world's economy. After all, the Soviet Union is today the largest producer of oil in the world.

But we have, through our intelligence, deduced this, pieced together enough information to have good confidence that this will be the case, and we've done this largely through open sources of unclassified information.

Now, I want to make it clear that we're not talking about the world running out of oil, running dry, or when that may happen. What we're simply talking about is the next seven to eight years,

and whether we can physically get enough oil out of the ground to meet increasing demand, even taking into account the prospects for shifting from oil to coal and nuclear power and other alternative sources of energy. We simply think that's not likely to happen and that there is going to be a supply and price crunch sometime in the early to mid-1980s.

After that, after 1985 or so, there are more opportunities for substitution, more opportunities for conservation, and so on, and it's a different question.

Now, one of the side benefits that we feel from publishing this type of study to the public is that it leads to exchanges with our critics. I personally wrote to every critic of this study of energy and asked for their detailed comments and criticisms. And those who replied were invited to come and spend a day with us and talk to the authors of this study and exchange ideas. And this has been very beneficial to us, and I hope to encourage this kind of interchange between intelligence analysts and academic and industrial communities.

We have also recently delivered a study to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress which they will release to the public next Tuesday. This is a study of the prospects for the entire Soviet economy over the next decade. We believe there are indicators that the Soviets have some very difficult problems ahead. In part, this is because of the oil situation that I have just described; in part, it's because of demographic factors which are going to slow the rate of growth of their labor force.

Now, in neither case, of the oil studies or the Soviet economy study, are we predicting that the Soviets' economic problems are insurmountable. What we're simply saying is that some of the characteristics of the Soviet economy -- its rigidity, its adherence to a false economic philosophy -- and some of the indicators of its performance in the recent past lead us to believe that the Soviet leadership is going to be facing some very difficult choices.

For instance, can they continue to export a million-and-a-half barrels of oil a day to their Eastern European satellites, or will they need to divert some of that to areas where they can earn hard currency?

For instance, will they let their economy slow down, or will they come to the United States and the rest of the Western World and ask for increased credits from us?

For instance, can they meet their increasing demands for labor in their industry and still maintain their huge military establishment?

Now, these are just some of the kinds of implications of

our findings on the Soviet economy. It's my hope that these studies, when released to the public, will contribute another perspective to an informed public debate on these issues and that they will also help to engage the American public with the intelligence community.

Let me assure you, however, that we cannot and we will not open up everything. An essential ingredient of an effective intelligence operation is the ability to preserve some secrets. Some of the information behind the Soviet oil and economy studies was derived from secret sources, sources which would dry up if we were to reveal them. Thus, we cannot forget that while we are moving to demystify intelligence and to build public understanding and support for what we do in the defense of our country, we must ask and obtain the public's cooperation in preserving that level of secrecy which is essential to these activities.

In short, today we are working in two separate directions simultaneously: declassifying information that needs not be classified, and by so doing attempting to promote a greater respect for that information that must remain secret; and secondly, on the other side of the coin, drawing a tighter protective circle around that information and those activities which are truly secret. We're downgrading more information to unclassify it and publishing it for public use on the one hand, and enforcing tighter, greater controls on secrecy, where justified, on the other.

Let me wrap up with three points.

The first is your intelligence community is a unique national resource, it's one without which this country could not operate as well as it does in the complicated world we live in today. It must be preserved.

Secondly, because of the intense interest in the Congress in intelligence oversight and the personal interest of the President and the Vice President, as well as the increased sensitivity within the intelligence community itself to matters of legality, morality and ethics, I can assure you that the intelligence community is doing the job that it was created to do, is doing it very competently, and is doing nothing else.

And finally, you will be hearing from your intelligence community. I intend to make the public one of the direct beneficiaries of our efforts to a degree that has never been attempted before. I ask your interest and your support.

Thank you.

[Applause]

MODERATOR: Thank you, Admiral Turner -- I got it right that time. I think, from the prolonged applause, that I can speak

for the entire audience to say we're grateful that you're in the spot that you are; we think we're in competent hands.

[Applause]

MODERATOR: If you'll now return to the podium, our president, David McDaniel, will present to you for your answers questions selected from those submitted to him in writing from the audience.

DAVID MCDANIEL: Thank you, Ken.

[Senior club members recognized]

MCDANIEL: And now, Admiral Turner, after those pleasant duties have been achieved, if you'll return. I am assured by our member today that this question reflects some items that were locally in the newspapers, and is not intended to be a reflection on the excellent management of the Palace Hotel.

Can you assure us that your agents have not done anything to the food today?

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: They better not -- they better not have, since I ate here, too.

[Laughter]

MCDANIEL: Admiral Turner, in your judgment, would the concentration of intelligence power just granted you represent a threat to the American people in the hands of a less-honorable successor?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I believe that the checks and the balances, some of which I described to you in my remarks, are ample insurance against that. An more than that, when you have a lot of divided authorities over delicate operations like these, it's possible that one branch will go off in one direction and one in the other without someone being sure to be in control of the whole thing.

I believe sincerely that this centralization of control over this collection side of the intelligence business is much to the public's benefit and gives a much greater sense that there will be control and responsibility. The President, the Congress can now look at me and say, "You've got the sack and you'd better do the job," whereas before it was more difficult to do that.

MCDANIEL: Admiral Turner, will your new duties as head of all intelligence agencies also include some supervision of the FBI in its counterintelligence work in the internal security field?

ADMIRAL TURNER: We have no connection with the FBI when it comes to the execution of justice -- or, the pursuit of justice in the United States. But -- the CIA has no mandate in the United States, the FBI has no mandate overseas.

So, when it comes to counter-intelligence, protecting ourselves against the intelligence operations of foreign powers inside the United States, that is the FBI's responsibility. Overseas, the CIA does that. And like a football game, we have a handoff of the ball here when the activity moves from overseas to the United States; if a foreign agent comes into this country from overseas, for instance.

To that extent, my new budget control authority will include the FBI, to the extent that they are working in this collaborative counterintelligence effort.

MCDANIEL: Thank you, Admiral Turner. You anticipated, in a way, this question: Is the Director of the CIA replaceable at any time at the whim of the President?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Absolutely.

MCDANIEL: Is it true, as Patrick Moynihan has suggested, that we do not crack down on spying by Russia and other countries within the United States because we fear retaliation by these countries on our intelligence-gathering abroad?

ADMIRAL TURNER: This is a very difficult, complex technical issue. It is one of what we can do to crack down on spying in the United States and it's one that actually transcends the intelligence field, the foreign intelligence field itself, as such.

Today, with the increased dependence of all of us on communications that go through the airwaves, great quantities of communications driven today, of course, by computers, all of us are vulnerable to the intercept of those communications on the airways, not only by foreign powers, by competing commercial and industrial activities, by illegal operatives in our own country. And we are trying very sincerely and have been studying for many months how to protect the citizen, the industry and commerce of our country, and the government from intrusion from all of these sources. It is not easy and it may be very expensive to provide a hundred percent protection. We're trying to find the best mix to do that today.

MCDANIEL: To what extent is there major duplication of intelligence effort by government agencies, and how much money is wasted by such duplication?

ADMIRAL TURNER: One of the objectives of this centralization of authority for collection is to eliminate wha duplication there may be that is not desirable or necessary. I don't think it

is large. And, in fact, I am almost more interested in my new role of authority, to some degree, over all of these intelligence agencies of insuring you that we're not dropping the ball between the cracks. We want to be sure that, between us, we are collecting all the information that we really need. But we are also going to look to eliminate any unnecessary duplication.

On the other hand, as I tried to emphasize, when it comes to analyzing this information, we want duplication. It's not very expensive, to begin with, but it's very critical.

The Defense Department analyzes largely military, but associated political activity. The State Department analyzes largely political and associated economic activity. The CIA analyzes economic, political and military activity. And that overlapping and intermeshing is what assures you that the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the military commanders, and others will not just get one man's opinion.

MCDANIEL: Admiral Turner, it has been documented that the Central Intelligence Agency covertly intervened in the political affairs of Allende's government in Chile on behalf of American business interests. Assuming a similar situation in the future, would you advocate this type of intelligence operation?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't accept the premise, but I deny that we would do it again.

[Laughter and applause]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Let me say that I have not touched today on what is known as covert action. Covert action is not an intelligence operation. Covert action is attempting to influence events in a foreign country without anyone knowing who did the influencing. If it's overthrowing a government, if it's issuing propaganda, if it's changing the economic structure, or whatever it may be, that's covert action.

The CIA is the covert-action activity of our country; it's been given that responsibility in addition to its intelligence responsibilities. But in recent years, we have established controls on that. There is no way that I can initiate a covert action of this type from the CIA. I must be asked for what we could do in a given situation by the National Security Council. I must then make that proposal. It must be approved by the National Security Council. The President himself must sign in writing that he approves this action. And then I must go notify seven committees of the Congress that we are going to do it. And if it isn't public by then, we'll do it.

[Laughter]

MCDANIEL: The next question: How long do you think it will take to regain the effectiveness overseas in carrying out their legitimate intelligence functions that has been lost over recent years of adverse publicity?

ADMIRAL TURNER: There's no way to answer that with a number, but I will certainly agree that we have been grievously injured in our intelligence capabilities by some of the unfortunate revelations, not just revelations of misdoing, but revelations of important information; traitors, like Mr. Agee and others, who have published, from their knowledge of the Central Intelligence Agency, the names of agents, the names of people and places, and so on. And it takes a while to recoup and to regain confidence.

We've had a number of people who were, in my view, heroes, people who were not American citizens but who were working for us overseas at the risk of their life because they believed in us, come to us and say, "Can I risk working for you any longer? Will my name appear in The Washington Post tomorrow?" And it's a difficult answer for me to give. And I've had to personally intervene in some of these to try to hang on to the splendid cooperation we're getting.

I can only say that there is a delicate balance in this country between what we all believe in, in the freedom of information, the freedom of inquiry, and the unnecessary exposure of delicate, sensitive, critical national security information.

MCDANIEL: Admiral Turner, perhaps this question should not be addressed to you, but here it is. What is the justification for the public nature of the investigation of the CIA's past activities, which not only lowers morale of the agencies but which may support anti-defense propaganda?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I think the justification is the Constitution of the United States and the establishment of the balance of powers between the Congress and the Executive Branch and the Judiciary. I think it's a very necessary thing. But just as in my last answer, there has to be a balance, and I think the creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the very recent creation of a corresponding committee in the House is helping us to have the Congress put these investigations into the right perspective. And I think we're moving in a very healthy direction here.

MCDANIEL: Does the CIA have a book on unidentified flying objects?

ADMIRAL TURNER: We have so many requests for information under what's known as the Freedom of Information Act on unidentified flying objects that whereas we normally charge you if you write in for this kind of material, the costs of reproducing it and so on,

that we've decided that there's so many of this, we have to give it away for free. But it's not that we're involved in unidentified flying objects; we are simply giving out whatever intelligence information we've received.

MCDANIEL: What is the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency?

ADMIRAL TURNER: President Carter and I have taken the position that we are not opposed to the Congress's publishing a single intelligence budget figure. We are very opposed to breaking that figure down into the CIA and the various other components. Because if it's broken down, an adversary can find out where you're putting your emphasis, and that's where he puts his counter-emphasis.

But in order to keep the public better informed and to put into some perspective what the magnitude of our operations are, we have told the Congress we would not oppose their publishing a single figure.

It's very interesting. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence debated this issue and voted 9-to-8 -- not on partisan or ideological grounds; they were shifting all over the place -- to release the information. And now they're going to debate it in the full Senate. And we'll see, probably in September, whether the Senate elects to make this figure public or to keep it secret.

MCDANIEL: Is there any shortage of highly-trained or capable applicants and recruits for CIA intelligence work?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Fortunately, no. And I'm very proud of the young people of our country, because despite the adverse publicity, and particularly on the college campuses, they are perceptive enough to see through this. And we continue to receive applications at the rate of about 10 for every opening of fine young men and women who are willing to accept what is really a lot of privation when you decide to become a member of the CIA; and you can't, sometimes, tell your family what you're doing or where you work, let alone your friends and others, and you can't get much public acclaim for it.

And they're coming to us, still, and we're very pleased; but it's one of my major concerns, to maintain that esprit, that attractiveness. Because if we don't, we won't have anything to speak of in 10 or 15 years.

MCDANIEL: The next question is: How does one go about getting a job with the CIA?

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: We have an office here.

Charles, would you stand up?

We have an office here in San Francisco; it's in the phone book. And if you give us a call, we'll be very happy to give you all that information. If that isn't convenient, get a postcard and write "CIA, Washington, D.C." and put on the back, "I'd like to join up"; and we'll send you all the information.

MCDANIEL: Thank you, Admiral Turner. We have time for only one more question, and when that is answered, this meeting will stand adjourned without further ceremony.

Before I ask that question, however, Admiral Stansfield Turner, I should like to thank you on behalf of the Commonwealth Club of California and its members and guests assembled here in the Palace Hotel in San Francisco, and also on behalf of the listeners on 110 radio stations over which your remarks will be rebroadcast during the coming week.

I think that that's a complete sentence. I'll assume that it is.

The last question, Admiral Turner, is: As an admiral, how does it feel to report to a Commander-in-Chief who was merely a lieutenant?

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I say aye-aye every day.

[Laughter and applause]